This article examines the disqualification of a congressional candidate in the Philippines who publicly offered sex to women in exchange for votes. Framed within Philippine jurisprudence and international human rights law, it argues that such conduct constitutes moral turpitude and is incompatible with the right to seek public office. It further rejects the defense of political speech and insists that democratic legitimacy demands a higher standard of conduct from those who seek to lead.

In any self-respecting democracy, there comes a moment when the absurd must no longer be tolerated. That moment comes when a would-be public official stands before a crowd, particularly women, and offers his body as a political commodity—promising to fulfill every desire in exchange for their vote. This is not politics; this is vulgarity in its most naked form. This is a mockery of everything the public office stands for.

It’s not just offensive. It’s a scandal. And those who defend this conduct, cloaking it in the hollow phrase “free speech,” are complicit in the degradation of our democracy. When a man seeks the public’s trust and instead offers sex for votes—whether in jest or in earnest—the line is not just crossed; it is obliterated. Politics should be about ideas, not about treating citizens, especially women, like objects to be bartered for power. And the only legitimate response is to throw the man out of the race, without hesitation.

This isn’t some grey area of legal theory. This is a clear-cut case of moral turpitude—an offense so vile it calls into question the very character of the man who dares to run for office. Philippine law is clear: moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity… contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.”¹ When a politician publicly degrades women in this manner, he doesn’t just break the law—he shows that he is unfit for office. His actions stain the very idea of representative democracy. If such behavior is allowed, then what does the office even mean?

The Omnibus Election Code may not specifically name “moral turpitude” as grounds for disqualification, but let’s not pretend this is some technical oversight. The Supreme Court has never hesitated to draw lines where conduct—particularly that which undermines the integrity of elections—falls well below what is acceptable for those seeking public office.² To offer sex for votes isn’t just crude; it is an assault on the integrity of the electoral process itself. It is an affront to every person who believes in the value of free and fair elections. It’s a crime against democracy, a betrayal of everything that office represents.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that candidates must not only be competent but must have the moral character to hold public trust. In Mamasapano v. COMELEC,³ the Court was clear: the fitness of a candidate isn’t just about technical qualifications. It’s about moral integrity. Public office is a public trust, and anyone who seeks that trust must be held to a higher standard. A man who offers sex to women in exchange for political support has shown he is not worthy of that trust.

Some will argue that this is just a joke, a lighthearted comment blown out of proportion. But that argument is as thin as it is dangerous. Political speech is protected, but the Constitution doesn’t give candidates a free pass to treat people as less than human. It does not protect speech that degrades, objectifies, or commodifies others. This is not about defending a candidate’s right to free expression. It is about defending the integrity of the electoral process, and it is about protecting the dignity of every citizen, every woman, who has a right to expect more from their would-be leaders.

If we ignore this conduct, we risk letting the lowest of the low into positions of power. But the law does not permit that, and neither does international human rights law. The Philippines is bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees freedom of expression under Article 19.⁴ But freedom of speech has limits. That limit is crossed when the speech in question degrades others, particularly when it contributes to the objectification of women. The Human Rights Committee has been unambiguous on this: speech that undermines public morals and human dignity does not enjoy protection under the ICCPR.

If that weren’t enough, let’s turn to the European Court of Human Rights, which has similarly ruled that political speech can—and should—be limited when it causes harm. In Féret v. Belgium, the Court held that political speech which incites hatred or undermines the dignity of others falls outside the protections afforded by freedom of expression.⁵ The principle is simple: the right to speak must be balanced by a responsibility to not degrade or harm others.

Then, we have the CEDAW framework, which the Philippines is bound to uphold. Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women obligates States to ensure women can participate in political and public life free from discrimination.⁶ It is a binding obligation, not a suggestion. And offering sex as a campaign promise to women is not only a gross violation of CEDAW’s spirit—it is a slap in the face to every woman who demands respect, not to be reduced to an object of political manipulation.

The CEDAW Committee has long recognized that gender-based violence, whether physical or verbal, includes acts of degradation and harassment.⁷ A candidate who offers sex for votes is not merely making an inappropriate joke; he is committing a form of gendered violence in the public sphere. This is not just bad taste; it is a violation of the human rights of every woman within earshot.

This should not be a matter of debate. It is, quite simply, a question of moral decency.

Public office demands higher standards—not perfection, but decency. A candidate who offers sex as a commodity to win votes is morally bankrupt. And the law should make it clear that such behavior has no place in any race for public office. Disqualifying such a person is not censorship; it is a matter of protecting the integrity of the electoral process. It is a matter of protecting the rights and dignity of every citizen—every woman—who deserves better than to be treated like a pawn in a sick political game.

Democracy isn’t just about counting votes. It is about ensuring that those who seek to represent the people do so with honor, integrity, and a basic respect for the dignity of all. Let us not allow this individual to sully that ideal.

bbandonell | 10 May 2025, London

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References:

1. In re: Pelaez, 44 Phil. 587 (1923). ↩︎
2. Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, B.P. Blg. 881, § 68 (1985). ↩︎
3. Datu Remegio Mamasapano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 197605 (Phil. 2015). ↩︎
4. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996). ↩︎
5. Féret v. Belgium, App. No. 15615/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). ↩︎
6. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 7, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. ↩︎
7. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women (2017). ↩︎